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Conditional inference plays a central role in logical and Bayesian
reasoning, and is used in a wide range of applications. It ba-
sically consists of expressing conditional relationship between
parent and child propositions, and then to combine those con-
ditionals with evidence about the parent propositions in order to
infer conclusions about the child propositions. While conditional
reasoning is a well established part of classical binary logic and
probability calculus, its extension to belief theory has only re-
cently been proposed. Subjective opinions represent a special
type of general belief functions. This article focuses on condi-
tional reasoning in subjective logic where beliefs are represented
in the form of binomial or multinomial subjective opinions. Bi-
nomial conditional reasoning operators for subjective logic have
been defined in previous contributions. We extend this approach
to multinomial opinions, thereby making it possible to represent
conditional and evidence opinions on frames of arbitrary size.
This makes subjective logic a powerful tool for conditional rea-
soning in situations involving ignorance and partial information,
and makes it possible to analyse Bayesian network models with
uncertain probabilities.
Key words: Subjective logic, Conditional, Deduction, Abduction, Belief
theory, Bayesian networks
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1 INTRODUCTION
Conditionals are propositions like “If we don’t hurry we’ll be late for the
show” or “If it rains, Michael will carry an umbrella” which are of the form
“IF x THEN y” where x denotes the antecedent and y the consequent propo-
sition. The truth value of conditionals can be evaluated in different ways, e.g.
as binary TRUE or FALSE, as a probability measure or as an opinion. Con-
ditionals are complex propositions because they contain an antecedent and a
consequent that are also propositions with truth values that can be evaluated
in the same way. Conditionals can be linked e.g. by letting a conditional
proposition be the antecedent of another conditional proposition.
The idea of having a conditional connection between an antecedent and a
consequent proposition can be traced back to Ramsey [21] who articulated
what has become known as Ramsey’s Test: To decide whether you believe a
conditional, provisionally or hypothetically add the antecedent to your stock
of beliefs, and consider whether to believe the consequent. This idea was
translated into a formal language by Stalnaker [27] in the form of the so-called
Stalnaker’s Hypothesis, formally expressed as: p(IF x THEN y) = p(y|x).
The interpretation of Stalnaker’s Hypothesis is that the probability of the con-
ditional proposition “IF x THEN y” is equal to the probability of the propo-
sition y given that the proposition x is TRUE. A more precise expression of
Stalnaker’s hypothesis is therefore p(IF x THEN y) = p(y|(p(x) = 1)), but
the bulkiness of this notation would make it impractical.
An alternative viewpoint to that of Stalnaker was put forward by Lewis
[18] who argued that conditional propositions do not have truth-values and
that they do not express propositions. This would mean that for any propo-
sitions x and y, there is no proposition z for which p(z) = p(y|x), so the
conditional probability can not be the same as the probability of conditionals.
In our opinion Stalnaker’s Hypothesis is sound and applicable for condi-
tional reasoning. We would argue against Lewis’ view by simply saying that
it is meaningful to assign a probability to a conditional proposition like “y|x”,
which is defined in case x is true, and undefined in case x is false.
Meaningful conditional deduction requires relevance between antecedent
and consequent, i.e. that the consequent depends on the antecedent. Condi-
tionals that are based on the dependence between consequent and antecedent
are universally valid, and are called logical conditionals [3]. Deduction with
logical conditionals reflect human intuitive conditional reasoning.
Both binary logic and probability calculus have mechanisms for condi-
tional reasoning. In binary logic, Modus Ponens (MP) and Modus Tollens
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(MT) are the classical operators which are used in any field of logic that re-
quires conditional deduction. In probability calculus, binomial conditional
deduction is expressed as:
p(y‖x) = p(x)p(y|x) + p(x)p(y|x) (1)
where the terms are interpreted as follows:
p(y|x) : the conditional probability of y given x is TRUE
p(y|x) : the conditional probability of y given x is FALSE
p(x) : the probability of the antecedent x
p(x) : the probability of the antecedent’s complement (= 1− p(x))
p(y‖x) : the deduced probability of the consequent y
The notation y‖x, introduced in [15], denotes that the truth or probability
of proposition y is deduced as a function of the probability of the antecedent
x together with the conditionals. The expression p(y‖x) thus represents a
derived value, whereas the expressions p(y|x) and p(y|x) represent input val-
ues together with p(x). Below, this notational convention will also be used
for opinions in subjective logic.
This article describes how the same principles for conditional inference
outlined above can be formulated in subjective logic. The advantage of this
approach is that conditional reasoning models can be analysed with subjective
opinions as input and output values, i.e. in the presence of uncertainty and
partial ignorance. This will also allow the analyst to appreciate the relative
proportions of firm evidence and uncertainty as contributing factors to the
derived probabilistic likelihoods.
This article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews probabilistic con-
ditional reasoning in order to provide a benchmark for subjective logic de-
scribed later. Section 3 reviews the belief representation used in classical
Dempster-Shafer belief theory as a background for subjective opinions. Sec-
tion 4 provides a brief review of previous approaches to conditional belief
reasoning. Section 5 describes subjective opinions which are used as argu-
ments in subjective logic. Section 6 describes conditional deduction and ab-
duction in subjective logic, and Section 7 describes how Bayesian networks
can be based on subjective logic. Section 8 suggests application domains of
conditional reasoning with subjective logic, and concludes the presentation.
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2 PROBABILISTIC CONDITIONAL REASONING
Classical results from probabilistic conditional reasoning are briefly reviewed
below in order to provide a benchmark for conditional reasoning with subjec-
tive logic, described in Sec.6.
2.1 Binomial Conditional Reasoning
Probabilistic conditional reasoning is used extensively in areas where conclu-
sions need to be derived from probabilistic input evidence, such as for making
diagnoses from medical tests. A pharmaceutical company that develops a test
for a particular infection disease will typically determine the reliability of the
test by letting a group of infected and a group of non-infected people undergo
the test. The result of these trials will then determine the reliability of the
test in terms of its sensitivity p(x|y) and false positive rate p(x|y), where x:
“Positive Test”, y: “Infected” and y: “Not infected”. The conditionals are
interpreted as:
• p(x|y): “The probability of positive test given infection”
• p(x|y): “The probability of positive test in the absence of infection”.
The problem with applying these reliability measures in a practical setting
is that the conditionals are expressed in the opposite direction to what the
practitioner needs in order to apply the expression of Eq.(1). The conditionals
needed for making the diagnosis are:
• p(y|x): “The probability of infection given positive test”
• p(y|x): “The probability of infection given negative test”
but these are usually not directly available to the medical practitioner. How-
ever, they can be obtained if the base rate of the infection is known.
The base rate fallacy [17] in medicine consists of making the erroneous as-
sumption that p(y|x) = p(x|y). While this reasoning error often can produce
a relatively good approximation of the correct diagnostic probability value, it
can lead to a completely wrong result and wrong diagnosis in case the base
rate of the disease in the population is very low and the reliability of the test
is not perfect. The required conditionals can be correctly derived by invert-
ing the available conditionals using Bayes rule. The inverted conditionals are
obtained as follows:
p(x|y) = p(x∧y)
p(y)
p(y|x) = p(x∧y)
p(x)
⇒ p(y|x) =
p(y)p(x|y)
p(x)
. (2)
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On the right hand side of Eq.(2) the base rate of the disease in the population
is expressed by p(y). By applying Eq.(1) with x and y swapped in every
term, the expected rate of positive tests p(x) in Eq.(2) can be computed as a
function of the base rate p(y). In the following, a(x) and a(y) will denote the
base rates of x and y respectively. The required conditional is:
p(y|x) =
a(y)p(x|y)
a(y)p(x|y) + a(y)p(x|y)
. (3)
A medical test result is typically considered positive or negative, so when
applying Eq.(1) it can be assumed that either p(x) = 1 (positive) or p(x)
= 1 (negative). In case the patient tests positive, Eq.(1) can be simplified to
p(y‖x) = p(y|x) so that Eq.(3) will give the correct likelihood that the patient
actually has contracted the disease.
2.2 Example 1: Probabilistic Medical Reasoning
Let the sensitivity of a medical test be expressed as p(x|y) = 0.9999 (i.e.
an infected person will test positive in 99.99% of the cases) and the false
positive rate be p(x|y) = 0.001 (i.e. a non-infected person will test posi-
tive in 0.1% of the cases). Let the base rate of infection in population A be
1% (expressed as a(yA)=0.01) and let the base rate of infection in popula-
tion B be 0.01% (expressed as a(yB)=0.0001). Assume that a person from
populationA tests positive, then Eq.(3) and Eq.(1) lead to the conclusion that
p(yA‖x) = p(yA|x) = 0.9099 which indicates a 91% likelihood that the per-
son is infected. Assume that a person from population B tests positive, then
p(yB‖x) = p(yB|x) = 0.0909 which indicates only a 9% likelihood that the
person is infected. By applying the correct method the base rate fallacy is
avoided in this example.
2.3 Deductive and Abductive Reasoning
In the general case where the truth of the antecedent is expressed as a proba-
bility, and not just binary TRUE and FALSE, the opposite conditional is also
needed as specified in Eq.(1). In case the negative conditional is not directly
available, it can be derived according to Eq.(3) by swapping x and x in every
term. This produces:
p(y|x) = a(y)p(x|y)
a(y)p(x|y)+a(y)p(x|y)
= a(y)(1−p(x|y))
a(y)(1−p(x|y))+a(y)(1−p(x|y)) .
(4)
Eq.(3) and Eq.(4) enables conditional reasoning even when the required
conditionals are expressed in the reverse direction to what is needed.
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The term frame⋆ will be used with the meaning of a traditional state space
of mutually disjoint states. We will use the term “parent frame” and “child
frame” to denote the reasoning direction, meaning that the parent frame is
what the analyst has evidence about, and probabilities over the child frame is
what the analyst needs. Defining parent and child frames is thus equivalent
with defining the direction of the reasoning.
Forward conditional inference, called deduction, is when the parent frame
is the antecedent and the child frame is the consequent of the available con-
ditionals. Reverse conditional inference, called abduction, is when the parent
frame is the consequent, and the child frame is the antecedent.
Deductive and abductive reasoning situations are illustrated in Fig.1 where
x denotes a state in the parent frame and y denotes a state in the child frame.
Conditionals are expressed as p(consequent |antecedent).
FIGURE 1
Visualising deduction and abduction
The concepts of “causal” and “derivative” reasoning can be meaningful
for clearly causal conditional relationships. By assuming that the antecedent
causes the consequent, then causal reasoning is equivalent to deductive rea-
soning, and derivative reasoning is equivalent to abductive reasoning.
In medical reasoning for example, the infection causes the test to be posi-
tive, not the other way. The reliability of medical tests is expressed as causal
conditionals, whereas the practitioner needs to apply the derivative inverted
conditionals. Starting from a positive test to conclude that the patient is in-
fected therefore represents derivative reasoning. Most people have a tendency
to reason in a causal manner even in situations where derivative reasoning is
⋆ Usually called frame of discernment in traditional belief theory
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required. In other words, derivative situations are often confused with causal
situations, which provides an explanation for the tendency of the base rate
fallacy in medical diagnostics. In legal reasoning, the same type of reasoning
error is called the prosecutor’s fallacy.
2.4 Multinomial Conditional Reasoning
So far in this presentation the parent and child frames have consisted of binary
sets {x, x} and {y, y}. In general, both the parent and child frames in a
conditional reasoning situation can consist of an arbitrary number of disjoint
states. Let X = {xi|i = 1 . . . k} be the parent frame with cardinality k, and
let Y = {yj|j = 1 . . . l} be the child frame with cardinality l. The deductive
conditional relationship between X and Y is then expressed with k vector
conditionals p(Y |xi), each being of l dimensions. This is illustrated in Fig.2.
FIGURE 2
Multinomial deductive vector conditionals between parent X and child Y
The vector conditional ~p(Y |xi) relates each state xi to the frame Y . The
elements of ~p(Y |xi) are the scalar conditionals expressed as:
p(yj |xi), where
l∑
j=1
p(yj |xi) = 1 . (5)
The probabilistic expression for multinomial conditional deduction from
X to Y , generalising that of Eq.(1), is the vector p(Y ‖X) over Y where each
scalar vector element p(yj‖X) is:
p(yj‖X) =
k∑
i=1
p(xi)p(yj |xi) . (6)
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The multinomial probabilistic expression for inverting conditionals, gen-
eralising that of Eq.(3), becomes:
p(yj |xi) =
a(yj)p(xi|yj)∑l
t=1 a(yt)p(xi|yt)
(7)
where a(yj) represents the base rate of yj .
By substituting the conditionals of Eq.(6) with inverted multinomial condi-
tionals from Eq.(7), the general expression for probabilistic abduction emerges:
p(yj‖X) =
k∑
i=1
p(xi)
(
a(yj)p(xi|yj)∑l
t=1 a(yt)p(xi|yt)
)
. (8)
This will be illustrated by a numerical example below.
2.5 Example 2: Probabilistic Intelligence Analysis
Two countries A and B are in conflict, and intelligence analysts of country B
want to find out whether country A intends to use military aggression. The
analysts of country B consider the following possible alternatives regarding
country A’s plans:
y1 : No military aggression from country A
y2 : Minor military operations by country A
y3 : Full invasion of country B by country A
(9)
The way the analysts will determine the most likely plan of countryA is by
trying to observe movement of troops in country A. For this, they have spies
placed inside country A. The analysts of country B consider the following
possible movements of troops.
x1 : No movement of country A’s troops
x2 : Minor movements of country A’s troops
x3 : Full mobilisation of all country A’s troops
(10)
The analysts have defined a set of conditional probabilities of troop move-
ments as a function of military plans, as specified by Table 1.
The rationale behind the conditionals are as follows. In case country A
has no plans of military aggression (y1), then there is little logistic reason
for troop movements. However, even without plans of military aggression
against country B it is possible that country A expects military aggression
from country B, forcing troop movements by country A. In case country A
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Troop movements
Probability x1 x2 x3
vectors No movemt. Minor movemt. Full mob.
~p(X |y1): p(x1|y1) = 0.50 p(x2|y1) = 0.25 p(x3|y1) = 0.25
~p(X |y2): p(x1|y2) = 0.00 p(x2|y2) = 0.50 p(x3|y2) = 0.50
~p(X |y3): p(x1|y3) = 0.00 p(x2|y3) = 0.25 p(x3|y3) = 0.75
TABLE 1
Conditional probabilities p(X|Y ): troop movement xi given military plan yj
prepares for minor military operations against country B (y2), then necessar-
ily troop movements are required. In case countryA prepares for full invasion
of country B (y3), then significant troop movements are required.
Based on observations by spies of country B, the analysts determine the
likelihoods of actual troop movements to be:
p(x1) = 0.00 , p(x2) = 0.50 , p(x3) = 0.50 . (11)
The analysts are faced with an abductive reasoning situation and must first
derive the conditionals p(Y |X). The base rate of military plans is set to:
a(y1) = 0.70 , a(y2) = 0.20 , a(y3) = 0.10 . (12)
The expression of Eq.(7) can now be used to derive the required condition-
als, which are given in Table 2 below.
Probabilities of military plans given troop movement
~p(Y |x1) ~p(Y |x2) ~p(Y |x3)
Military plan No movemt. Minor movemt. Full mob.
y1: No aggr. p(y1|x1) = 1.00 p(y1|x2) = 0.58 p(y1|x3) = 0.50
y2: Minor ops. p(y2|x1) = 0.00 p(y2|x2) = 0.34 p(y2|x3) = 0.29
y3: Invasion p(y3|x1) = 0.00 p(y3|x2) = 0.08 p(y3|x3) = 0.21
TABLE 2
Conditional probabilities p(Y |X): military plan yj given troop movement xi
The expression of Eq.(6) can then be used to derive the probabilities of
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military plans of country A, resulting in:
p(y1‖X) = 0.54 , p(y2‖X) = 0.31 , p(y3‖X) = 0.15 . (13)
Based on the results of Eq.(13), it seems most likely that country A does
not plan any military aggression against country B. Analysing the same ex-
ample with subjective logic in Sec.6.4 will show that these results give a
misleading estimate of country A’s plans because they hide the underlying
uncertainty.
3 BELIEF REPRESENTATIONS
Traditional probabilities are not suitable for expressing ignorance about the
likelihoods of possible states or outcomes. If somebody wants to express
ignorance as “I don’t know” this would be impossible with a simple scalar
probability value. A probability 0.5 would for example mean that the event
will take place 50% of the time, which in fact is quite informative, and very
different from ignorance. Alternatively, a uniform probability density func-
tion over all possible states would more closely express the situation of ig-
norance about the outcome of an event. Subjective opinions which can be
interpreted as probability density functions, and which are related to belief
functions, can be used to express this type of ignorance. As a background for
subjective opinions, the theory of belief functions will be briefly described.
Belief theory represents an extension of classical probability by allowing
explicit expression of ignorance. Belief theory has its origin in a model for
upper and lower probabilities proposed by Dempster in 1960. Shafer later
proposed a model for expressing beliefs [22]. The main idea behind belief
theory is to abandon the additivity principle of probability theory, i.e. that the
sum of probabilities on all pairwise disjoint states must add up to one. Instead
belief theory gives observers the ability to assign so-called belief mass to any
subset of the frame, i.e. to non-exclusive possibilities including the whole
frame itself. The main advantage of this approach is that ignorance, i.e. the
lack of information, can be explicitly expressed e.g. by assigning belief mass
to the whole frame.
The term uncertainty can be used to express many different aspects of our
perception of reality. In this article, it will be used in the sense of uncertainty
about probability values. This is different from imprecise probabilities which
are normally interpreted as a pair of upper and lower probability values. A
philosophical problem with imprecise probabilities is described in Sec.4.3.
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General belief functions allow complex belief structures to be expressed
on arbitrarily large frames. Shafer’s book [22] describes many aspects of
belief theory, but the two main elements are 1) a flexible way of expressing
beliefs, and 2) a conjunctive method for fusing beliefs, commonly known as
Dempster’s Rule. We will not be concerned with Dempster’s rule here.
In order for this presentation to be self contained, central concepts from
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence [22] are recalled. Let X = {xi, i =
1, · · · , k} denote a frame (of discernment) consisting of a finite set of exhaus-
tive and disjoint possible values for a state variable of interest. Let further 2X
denote its powerset, i.e. the set of all possible subsets of X . The frame can
for example be the set of six possible outcomes of throwing a dice, and the
(unknown) outcome of a particular instance of throwing the dice becomes the
state variable. A bba (basic belief assignment† ), denoted by m is defined as
a belief mass distribution function from 2X to [0, 1] satisfying:
m(∅) = 0 and
∑
x⊆X
m(x) = 1 . (14)
Values of a bba are called belief masses. Each subset x ⊆ X such that
m(x) > 0 is called a focal element.
The probability expectation projection [4], also known as the pignistic
transformation [25, 26], produces a probability expectation value, denoted
by E(x), defined as:
E(x) =
∑
y∈2X
m(y)
|x ∩ y|
|y|
, x ∈ 2X . (15)
A few special bba classes are worth mentioning. A vacuous bba has
m(X) = 1, i.e. no belief mass committed to any proper subset of X . A
Bayesian bba is when all the focal elements are singletons, i.e. one-element
subsets of X . If all the focal elements are nestable (i.e. linearly ordered by
inclusion) then we speak about consonant bba. A dogmatic bba is defined by
Smets [24] as a bba for which m(X) = 0. Let us note, that trivially, every
Bayesian bba is dogmatic.
4 REVIEW OF BELIEF-BASED CONDITIONAL REASONING
In this section, previous approaches to conditional reasoning with beliefs and
related frameworks are briefly reviewed.
† Called basic probability assignment in [22], and Belief Mass Assignment (BMA) in [8].
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4.1 Smets’ Disjunctive Rule and Generalised Bayes Theorem
An early attempt at articulating belief-based conditional reasoning was pro-
vided by Smets (1993) [23] and by Xu & Smets [31, 30]. This approach is
based on using the so-called Generalised Bayes Theorem as well as the Dis-
junctive Rule of Combination, both of which are defined within the Dempster-
Shafer belief theory.
In the binary case, Smets’ approach assumes a conditional connection be-
tween a binary parent frame Θ and a binary child frame X defined in terms
of belief masses and conditional plausibilities. In Smets’ approach, binomial
deduction is defined as:
pl(x) = m(θ)pl(x|θ)+m(θ)pl(x|θ)+m(Θ)(1−(1−pl(x|θ))(1−pl(x|θ)))
pl(x) = m(θ)pl(x|θ)+m(θ)pl(x|θ)+m(Θ)(1−(1−pl(x|θ))(1−pl(x|θ)))
pl(X)= m(θ)pl(X |θ)+m(θ)pl(X |θ)+m(Θ)(1−(1−pl(X |θ))(1−pl(X |θ)))
(16)
The next example illustrate a case where Smets’ deduction operator pro-
duces inconsistent results. Let the conditional plausibilities be expressed as:
Θ 7−→ X :
∣∣∣∣pl(x|θ) = 1/4 pl(x|θ) = 3/4 pl(X |θ) = 1pl(x|θ) = 1/4 pl(x|θ) = 3/4 pl(X |θ) = 1
∣∣∣∣ (17)
Eq.(17) expresses that the plausibilities of x are totally independent of θ
because pl(x|θ) = pl(x|θ) and pl(x|θ) = pl(x|θ). Let now two bbas, mAΘ
and mBΘ on Θ be expressed as:
mAΘ :

mAΘ(θ) = 1/2
mAΘ(θ) = 1/2
mAΘ(Θ) = 0
mBΘ :

mBΘ(θ) = 0
mBΘ(θ) = 0
mBΘ(Θ) = 1
(18)
This results in the following plausibilities pl, belief masses mX and pig-
nistic probabilities E on X in Table 3:
Because X is totally independent of Θ according to Eq.(17), the bba on X
should not be influenced by the bbas on Θ. It can be seen from Table 3 that
the probability expectation values E are equal for both bbas, which seems to
indicate consistency. However, the belief masses are different, which shows
that Smets’ method [23] can produce inconsistent results. It can be mentioned
that the framework of subjective logic described in Sec.6 does not have this
problem.
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State Result of mAΘ on Θ Result of mBΘ on Θ
pl mΘ E pl mΘ E
x 1/4 1/4 1/4 7/16 1/16 1/4
x 3/4 3/4 3/4 1/16 9/16 3/4
X 1 0 n.a. 1 6/16 n.a.
TABLE 3
Inconsistent results of deductive reasoning with Smets’ method
In Smets’ approach, binomial abduction is defined as:
pl(θ) = m(x)pl(x|θ) +m(x)pl(x|θ) +m(X)(pl(X |θ))) ,
pl(θ) = m(x)pl(x|θ) +m(x)pl(x|θ) +m(X)pl(X |θ))) ,
pl(Θ)= m(x)(1 − (1− pl(x|θ))(1 − pl(x|θ)))
+m(x)(1 − (1− pl(x|θ))(1 − pl(x|θ)))
+m(X)(1− (1− pl(X |θ))(1− pl(X |θ))) .
(19)
Eq.(19) fails to take the base rates on Θ into account and would therefore
unavoidably be subject to the base rate fallacy, which would also be inconsis-
tent with probabilistic reasoning as e.g. described in Example 1 (Sec.2.2). It
can be mentioned that abduction with subjective logic described in Sec.6 is
always consistent with probabilistic abduction.
4.2 Halpern’s Approach to Conditional Plausibilities
Halpern (2001) [5] analyses conditional plausibilities from an algebraic point
of view, and concludes that conditional probabilities, conditional plausibili-
ties and conditional possibilities share the same algebraic properties. Halpern’s
analysis does not provide any mathematical methods for practical conditional
deduction or abduction.
4.3 Conditional Reasoning with Imprecise Probabilities
Imprecise probabilities are generally interpreted as probability intervals that
contain the assumed real probability values. Imprecision is then an increasing
function of the interval size [28]. Various conditional reasoning frameworks
based on notions of imprecise probabilities have been proposed.
Credal networks introduced by Cozman [1] are based on credal sets, also
called convex probability sets, with which upper and lower probabilities can
be expressed. In this theory, a credal set is a set of probabilities with a defined
upper and lower bound. There are various methods for deriving credal sets,
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e.g. [28]. Credal networks allow credal sets to be used as input in Bayesian
networks. The analysis of credal networks is in general more complex than
the analysis of traditional probabilistic Bayesian networks because it requires
multiple analyses according to the possible probabilities in each credal set.
Various algorithms can be used to make the analysis more efficient.
Weak non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning with conditional constraints
proposed by Lukasiewicz [19] is also based on probabilistic conditionals ex-
pressed with upper and lower probability values. Various properties for condi-
tional deduction are defined for weak non-monotonic probabilistic reasoning,
and algorithms are described for determining whether conditional deduction
properties are satisfied for a set of conditional constraints.
The surveyed literature on credal networks and non-monotonic probabilis-
tic reasoning only describe methods for deductive reasoning, although abduc-
tive reasoning under these formalisms would theoretically be possible.
A philosophical concern with imprecise probabilities in general, and with
conditional reasoning with imprecise probabilities in particular, is that there
can be no real upper and lower bound to probabilities unless these bounds
are set to the trivial interval [0, 1]. This is because probabilities about real
world propositions can never be absolutely certain, thereby leaving the pos-
sibility that the actual observed probability is outside the specified interval.
For example, Walley’s Imprecise Dirichlet Model (IDM) [29] is based on
varying the base rate over all possible outcomes in the frame of a Dirichlet
distribution. The probability expectation value of an outcome resulting from
assigning the total base rate (i.e. equal to one) to that outcome produces the
upper probability, and the probability expectation value of an outcome re-
sulting from assigning a zero base rate to that outcome produces the lower
probability. The upper and lower probabilities are then interpreted as the up-
per and lower bounds for the relative frequency of the outcome. While this is
an interesting interpretation of the Dirichlet distribution, it can not be taken
literally. According to this model, the upper and lower probability values for
an outcome xi are defined as:
IDM Upper Probability: P (xi) =
r(xi) + C
C +
∑k
i=1 r(xi)
(20)
IDM Lower Probability: P (xi) =
r(xi)
C +
∑k
i=1 r(xi)
(21)
where r(xi) is the number of observations of outcome xi, and C is the weight
of the non-informative prior probability distribution.
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It can easily be shown that these values can be misleading. For example,
assume an urn containing nine red balls and one black ball, meaning that the
relative frequencies of red and black balls are p(red) = 0.9 and p(black) =
0.1. The a priori weight is set to C = 2. Assume further that an observer
picks one ball which turns out to be black. According to Eq.(21) the lower
probability is then P (black) = 13 . It would be incorrect to literally interpret
this value as the lower bound for the relative frequency because it obviously
is greater than the actual relative frequency of black balls. This example
shows that there is no guarantee that the actual probability of an event is inside
the interval defined by the upper and lower probabilities as described by the
IDM. This result can be generalised to all models based on upper and lower
probabilities, and the terms “upper” and “lower” must therefore be interpreted
as rough terms for imprecision, and not as absolute bounds.
Opinions used in subjective logic do not define upper and lower proba-
bility bounds. As opinions are equivalent to general Dirichlet probability
density functions, they always cover any probability value except in the case
of dogmatic opinions which specify discrete probability values.
5 THE OPINION REPRESENTATION IN SUBJECTIVE LOGIC
Subjective logic[7, 8] is a type of probabilistic logic that explicitly takes un-
certainty and belief ownership into account. Arguments in subjective logic
are subjective opinions about states in a frame. A binomial opinion applies to
a single proposition, and can be represented as a Beta distribution. A multi-
nomial opinion applies to a collection of propositions, and can be represented
as a Dirichlet distribution. Subjective logic also corresponds to a specific type
of belief functions which are described next.
5.1 The Dirichlet bba
A special type of bba called Dirichlet bba corresponds to opinions used in
subjective logic. Dirichlet bbas are characterised by allowing only mutually
disjoint focal elements, in addition to the whole frame X itself. This is de-
fined as follows.
Definition 1 (Dirichlet bba) Let X be a frame and let (xi, xj) be arbitrary
subsets of X . A bbamX where the only focal elements are X and/or mutually
exclusive subsets of X is a Dirichlet belief mass distribution function, called
Dirichlet bba for short. This constraint can be expressed mathematically as:
((xi 6=xj) ∧ (xi∩xj 6= ∅))⇒ ((mX(xi) = 0) ∨ (mX(xj) = 0)) . (22)
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The name “Dirichlet” bba is used because bbas of this type correspond to
Dirichlet probability density functions under a specific mapping. A bijective
mapping between Dirichlet bbas and Dirichlet probability density functions
is described in [10, 11].
5.2 The Base Rate
Let X be a frame and let mX be a Dirichlet bba on X . The relative share of
the uncertainty mass mX(X) assigned to subsets of X when computing their
probability expectation values can be defined by a function a. This function
is the base rate function, as defined below.
Definition 2 (Base Rate Function) Let X = {xi|i = 1, . . . k} be a frame
and let mX be a Dirichlet bba on X . The function a :X 7−→ [0, 1] satisfying:
a(∅) = 0 and
∑
x∈X
a(x) = 1 (23)
that defines the relative contribution of the uncertainty mass mX(X) to the
probability expectation values of xi is called a base rate function on X .
The introduction of the base rate function allows the derivation of the prob-
ability expectation value to be independent from the internal structure of the
frame. In the default case, the base rate function for each element is 1/k
where k is the cardinality, but it is possible to define arbitrary base rates for
all mutually exclusive elements of the frame, as long as the additivity con-
straint of Eq.(23) is satisfied.
The probability expectation value E(xi) derived from a Dirichlet bba m is
a function of the bba and the base rate function a, as expressed by:
E(xi) = m(xi) + a(xi)m(X) . (24)
A central problem when applying conditional reasoning in real world sit-
uations is the determination of base rates. A distinction can be made between
events that can be repeated many times and events that can only happen once.
Events that can be repeated many times are frequentist in nature and the
base rates for these can be derived from knowledge of the observed situation,
or reasonably approximated through empirical observation. For example, if
an observer only knows the number of different colours that balls in an urn
can have, then the inverse of that number will be the base rate of drawing a
ball of a specific colour. For frequentist problems where base rates cannot be
known with absolute certainty, then approximation through prior empirical
observation is possible.
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For events that can only happen once, the observer must often decide what
the base rates should be based on subjective intuition, which therefore can be-
come a source of error in conditional reasoning. When nothing else is know,
the default base rate should be defined to be equally partitioned between all
disjoint states in the frame, i.e. when there are k states, the default base rate
should be set to 1/k.
The difference between the concepts of subjective and frequentist proba-
bilities is that the former can be defined as subjective betting odds – and the
latter as the relative frequency of empirically observed data, where the two
collapse in the case where empirical data is available [2]. The concepts of
subjective and empirical base rates can be defined in a similar manner where
they also converge and merge into a single base rate when empirical data is
available.
5.3 Example 3: Base Rates of Diseases
The base rate of diseases within a community can be estimated. Typically,
data is collected from hospitals, clinics and other sources where people di-
agnosed with the disease are treated. The amount of data that is required to
calculate the base rate of the disease will be determined by some departmen-
tal guidelines, statistical analysis, and expert opinion about the data that it is
truly reflective of the actual number of infections – which is itself a subjec-
tive assessment. After the guidelines, analysis and opinion are all satisfied,
the base rate will be determined from the data, and can then be used with med-
ical tests to provide a better indication of the likelihood of specific patients
having contracted the disease [6].
5.4 Subjective Opinions
Subjective opinions, called “opinions” for short, represent a special type of
belief functions used in subjective logic. Through the equivalence between
subjective opinions and probability density functions in the form of Beta and
Dirichlet distributions, subjective logic also provides a calculus for such prob-
ability density functions.
A subjective opinion consists of the combination of a Dirichlet bba and a
base rate function contained in a single composite function. In order to have
a simple and intuitive notation, the Dirichlet bba is split into a belief mass
vector~b and an uncertainty mass u. This is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Belief Mass Vector and Uncertainty Mass)
Let mX be a Dirichlet bba. The belief mass vector ~bX and the uncertainty
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mass uX are defined as follows:
Belief masses: ~bX(xi) = mX(xi) where xi 6= X ,
Uncertainty mass: uX = mX(X) .
(25)
It can be noted that Eq.(14) makes opinions satisfy the belief mass addi-
tivity criterion:
uX +
k∑
x=1
~bX(xi) = 1 . (26)
Belief mass additivity is different from probability additivity in that only ele-
ments of X can carry probability whereas the frame X as well as its elements
can carry belief mass. The belief mass vector ~bX , the uncertainty mass uX
and the base rate vector ~a are used in the definition of subjective opinions.
Definition 4 (Subjective Opinions) Let X = {xi|i = 1 . . . k} be a frame
and let mX be a Dirichlet bba on X with belief mass vector ~bX and uncer-
tainty mass uX . Let ~aX be a base rate vector on X . The composite function
ωX = (~bX , uX ,~aX) is then a subjective opinion on X .
We use the convention that the subscript on the opinion symbol indicates
the frame to which the opinion applies, and that a superscript indicates the
owner of the opinion. For example, the opinion ωAX represents subject entity
A’s opinion over the frame X . An alternative notation is ω(A : X). The
owner can be omitted whenever irrelevant.
Opinions can be be geometrically represented as points in a pyramid with
dimensions equal to the cardinality of the frame. For example Fig.3 illustrates
an opinion pyramid on a ternary frame.
The uncertainty of the opinion is equal to the relative vertical distance from
the base to the opinion point. Dogmatic opinions have zero uncertainty. The
belief mass on a state xi is equal to the relative distance from the triangular
side plane to the opinion point when measured towards the vertex correspond-
ing to the state. Specific belief and base rate parameters are referred to as:{
Belief parameters: bxi = ~bX(xi) ,
Base rate parameters: axi = ~aX(xi) .
(27)
The base rate vector ~aX can be represented as a point on the pyramid base,
and the line joining the pyramid apex with that point is called the director. The
projection of the opinion onto the base parallel to the director determines the
probability expectation value vector ~EX .
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FIGURE 3
Visualisation of trinomial opinion
Assuming that the frame X has cardinality k, then the belief mass vector
~bX and the base rate vector ~aX will have k parameters each. The uncertainty
mass uX is a simple scalar. A subjective opinion over a frame of cardinality
k will thus contain (2k + 1) parameters. However, given the constraints of
Eq.(14) and Eq.(23), the opinion will only have (2k− 1) degrees of freedom.
A binomial opinion will for example have three degrees of freedom.
Equivalently to the probability projection of Eq.(24), the probability trans-
formation of subjective opinions can be expressed as a function of the belief
mass vector, the uncertainty mass and the base rate vector.
Definition 5 (Probability Expectation) Let X = {xi|i = 1, . . . k} be a
frame, and let ωX be a subjective opinion on X consisting of belief mass
vector ~b, uncertainty mass u and base rate vector ~a. The function EX from
ωX to [0, 1] defining the probability expectation values expressed as:
EX(xi) = ~bX(xi) + ~aX(xi)uX (28)
is then called the probability expectation function of opinions.
It can be shown that EX satisfies the additivity principle:
EX(∅) = 0 and
∑
x∈X
EX(x) = 1 . (29)
The base rate function of Def.2 expresses a priori probability, whereas the
probability expectation function of Eq.(28) expresses a posteriori probability.
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With a cardinality k, the default base rate for each element in the frame is
1/k, but it is possible to define arbitrary base rates for all mutually exclusive
elements as long as the additivity constraint of Eq.(23) is satisfied.
Two different subjective opinions on the same frame will normally share
the same base rate functions. However, it is obvious that two different ob-
servers can assign different base rate functions to the same frame, and this
could naturally reflect two different analyses of the same situation by two
different persons.
5.5 Binomial Subjective Opinions
A special notation is used to denote a binomial subjective opinion which con-
sists of an ordered tuple containing the three specific belief masses belief,
disbelief, uncertainty as well as the base rate of xi.
Definition 6 (Binomial Subjective Opinion) Let X be a frame where xi ∈
X is a state of interest. Assume mX to be a Dirichlet bba on X , and aX to
be a base rate function on X . The ordered quadruple ωxi defined as:
ωxi = (bxi , dxi , uxi , axi), where

Belief: bxi = mX(xi)
Disbelief: dxi = mX(xi)
Uncertainty: uxi = mX(X)
Base rate: axi = aX(xi)
(30)
is then called a binomial opinion on xi in the binary frame X = {xi, xi}.
Binomial subjective opinions can be mapped to a point in an equal-sided
triangle as illustrated in Fig.4.
The relative distance from the left side edge to the point represents be-
lief, from the right side edge to the point represents disbelief, and from the
base line to the point represents uncertainty. For an arbitrary binomial opin-
ion ωx = (bx, dx, ux, ax), the three parameters bx, dx and ux thus deter-
mine the position of the opinion point in the triangle. The base line is the
probability axis, and the base rate value can be indicated as a point on the
probability axis. Fig.4 illustrates an example opinion about x with the value
ωx = (0.7, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5) indicated by a black dot in the triangle. The
probability expectation value of a binomial opinion derived from Eq.(28), is:
E(ωxi) = bxi + axiuxi . (31)
The projector going through the opinion point, parallel to the line that
joins the uncertainty corner and the base rate point, determines the probability
expectation value of Eq.(31).
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FIGURE 4
Opinion triangle with example binomial opinion
Although a binomial opinion consists of four parameters, it only has three
degrees of freedom because the three components bx, dx and ux are depen-
dent through Eq.(14). As such they represent the traditional Bel(x) (Belief)
and Pl(x) (Plausibility) pair of Shaferian belief theory through the correspon-
dence Bel(x) = bx and Pl(x) = bx + ux.
The redundant parameter in the binomial opinion representation allows for
more compact expressions of subjective logic operators than otherwise would
have been possible. Various visualisations of binomial opinions are possible
to facilitate human interpretation‡ .
Binomial opinions are used in traditional subjective logic operators defined
in [8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 20]. It can be shown that binomial opinions are equiva-
lent to Beta distributions [8] and that multinomial opinions are equivalent to
Dirichlet distributions [10].
6 CONDITIONAL REASONING IN SUBJECTIVE LOGIC
In sections 1 and 2 basic notions of classical probabilistic conditional rea-
soning were presented. This section extends the same type of conditional
reasoning to subjective opinions. While conditional reasoning operators for
‡ See for example the online demo of subjective logic at http://www.unik.no/people/josang/sl/
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binomial opinions have already been described [15, 20], their generalisation
to multinomial opinions will be described below.
6.1 Notation for Deduction and Abduction
Let X = {xi|i = 1 . . . k} and Y = {yj|j = 1 . . . l} be frames, where X will
play the role of parent, and Y will play the role of child.
Assume the parent opinion ωX where |X | = k. Assume also the con-
ditional opinions of the form ωY |xi , where i = 1 . . . k. There is thus one
conditional for each element xi in the parent frame. Each of these condi-
tionals must be interpreted as the subjective opinion on Y , given that xi is
TRUE. The subscript notation on each conditional opinion indicates not only
the frame Y it applies to, but also the element xi on which it is conditioned.
Similarly to Eq.(6), subjective logic conditional deduction is expressed as: .
ωY ‖X = ωX ⊚ ωY |X (32)
where ⊚ denotes the general conditional deduction operator for subjective
opinions, and ωY |X = {ωY |xi |i = 1 . . . k} is a set of k = |X | different
opinions conditioned on each xi ∈ X respectively. Similarly, the expressions
for subjective logic conditional abduction is expressed as:
ω
Y ‖X = ωX⊚(ωX|Y ,~aY ) (33)
where ⊚ denotes the general conditional abduction operator for subjective
opinions, and ωX|Y = {ωX|yj |j = 1 . . . l} is a set of l = |Y | different
Dirichlet opinions conditioned on each yj ∈ Y respectively.
The mathematical methods for evaluating the general deduction and ab-
duction operators of Eq.(32) and Eq.(33) are described next.
6.2 Subjective Logic Deduction
Assume that a conditional relationship exists between the two frames X and
Y . Let ωY |X be the set of conditional opinions on the consequent frame Y as
a function of the opinion on the antecedent frame X expressed as
ωY |X :
{
ωY |xi, i = 1, . . . k
}
. (34)
Each conditional opinion is a tuple composed of a belief vector ~bY |xi , an
uncertainty mass uY |xi and a base rate vector ~aY expressed as:
ωY |xi =
(
~bY |xi , uY |xi ,~aY
)
. (35)
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Note that the base rate vector ~aY is equal for all conditional opinions of
Eq.(34). Let ωX be the opinion on the antecedent frame X .
Traditional probabilistic conditional deduction can always be derived from
these opinions by inserting their probability expectation values into Eq.(6),
resulting in the expression:
E(yj‖X) =
k∑
i=1
E(xi)E(yj|xi) (36)
where Eq.(28) provides each factor.
The operator for subjective logic deduction takes the uncertainty of ωY |X
and ωX into account when computing the derived opinion ωY ‖X as indicated
by Eq.(32). The method for computing the derived opinion described below
is based on a geometric analysis of the input opinions ωY |X and ωX , and how
they relate to each other.
The conditional opinions will in general define a sub-pyramid inside the
opinion pyramid of the child frame Y . A visualisation of deduction with
ternary parent and child pyramids and trinomial opinions is illustrated in
Fig.5.
FIGURE 5
Sub-pyramid defined as the conditional projection of the parent pyramid.
The sub-pyramid formed by the conditional projection of the parent pyra-
mid into the child pyramid is shown as the shaded pyramid on the right hand
side in Fig.5. The position of the derived opinion ωY ‖X is geometrically de-
termined by the point inside the sub-pyramid that linearly corresponds to the
opinion ωX in the parent pyramid.
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In general, the sub-pyramid will not appear as regular as in the example
of Fig.5, and can be skewed in all possible ways. The dimensionality of
the sub-pyramid is equal to the smallest cardinality of X and Y . For binary
frames, the sub-pyramid is reduced to a triangle. Visualising pyramids larger
than ternary is impractical on two-dimensional media such as paper and flat
screens.
The mathematical procedure for determining the derived opinion ωY ‖X is
described in four steps below. The uncertainty of the sub-pyramid apex will
emerge from the largest sub-triangle in any dimension of Y when projected
against the triangular side planes, and is derived in steps 1 to 3 below. The
following expressions are needed for the computations.
E(yt|X̂) =
∑k
i=1 axiE(yt|xi) ,
E(yt|(x̂r , xs)) = (1−ayt)byt|xs + ayt(byt|xr + uY |xr) .
(37)
The expression E(yt|X̂) gives the expectation value of yt given a vacuous
opinion ω bX on X . The expression E(yt|(x̂r, xs)) gives the expectation value
of yt for the theoretical maximum uncertainty uTyt .
• Step 1: Determine the X-dimensions (xr, xs) that give the largest the-
oretical uncertainty uTyt in each Y -dimension yt, independently of the
opinion on X . Each dimension’s maximum uncertainty is:
uTyt = 1−Min
[(
1−byt|xr−uY |xr+byt|xs
)
, ∀(xr, xs)∈X
]
. (38)
The X-dimensions (xr, xs) are recorded for each yt. Note that it is
possible to have xr = xs.
• Step 2: First determine the triangle apex uncertainty u
yt‖ bX
for each
Y -dimension by assuming a vacuous opinion ω bX and the actual base
rate vector ~aX . Assuming that ayt 6= 0 and ayt 6= 1 for all base rates
on Y , each triangle apex uncertainty u
yt‖ bX
can be computed as:
Case A: E(yt|X̂) ≤ E(yt|(x̂r , xs)) :
u
yt‖ bX
=
(
E(yt|X̂)− byt|xs
ayt
)
(39)
Case B: E(yt|X̂) > E(yt|(x̂r , xs)) :
u
yt‖ bX
=
(
byt|xr + uY |xr − E(yt|X̂)
1− ayt
)
(40)
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Then determine the intermediate sub-pyramid apex uncertainty uInt
Y ‖ bX
which is equal to the largest of the triangle apex uncertainties computed
above. This uncertainty is expressed as.
uInt
Y ‖ bX
= Max
[
u
yt‖ bX
, ∀yt ∈ Y
]
. (41)
• Step 3: First determine the intermediate belief components bInt
yj‖ bX
in
case of vacuous belief on X as a function of the intermediate apex
uncertainty uInt
Y ‖ bX
:
bInt
yj‖ bX
= E(yj‖X̂)− ayju
Int
Y ‖ bX
. (42)
For particular geometric combinations of the triangle apex uncertain-
ties u
yt‖ bX
it is possible that an intermediate belief component bInt
yj‖ bX
becomes negative. In such cases a new adjusted apex uncertainty uAdj
yt‖ bX
is computed. Otherwise the adjusted apex uncertainty is set equal to the
intermediate apex uncertainty of Eq.(41). Thus:
Case A: bInt
yj‖ bX
< 0 : uAdj
yj‖ bX
= E(yj‖X̂)/ayj (43)
Case B: bInt
yj‖ bX
≥ 0 : uAdj
yj‖ bX
= uInt
Y ‖ bX
(44)
Then compute the sub-pyramid apex uncertainty u
Y ‖ bX as the minimum
of the adjusted apex uncertainties according to:
u
Y ‖ bX = Min
[
uAdj
yj‖ bX
, ∀yj ∈ Y
]
. (45)
Note that the apex uncertainty is not necessarily the highest uncertainty
of the sub-pyramid. It is possible that one of the conditionals ωY |xi
actually contains a higher uncertainty, which would simply mean that
the sub-pyramid is skewed or tilted to the side.
• Step 4: Based on the sub-pyramid apex uncertainty u
Y ‖ bX , the actual
uncertainty uY ‖X as a function of the opinion on X is:
uY ‖X = uY ‖ bX −
k∑
i=1
(u
Y ‖ bX − uY |xi)bxi . (46)
Given the actual uncertainty uY ‖X , the actual beliefs byj‖X are:
byj‖X = E(yj‖X)− ayjuY ‖X . (47)
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The belief vector~bY ‖X is expressed as:
~bY ‖X =
{
byj‖X | j = 1, . . . l
}
. (48)
Finally, the derived opinion ωY ‖X is the tuple composed of the belief
vector of Eq.(48), the uncertainty belief mass of Eq.(46) and the base
rate vector of Eq.(35) expressed as:
ωY ‖X =
(
~bY ‖X , uY ‖X ,~aY
)
. (49)
The method for multinomial deduction described above represents both
a simplification and a generalisation of the method for binomial deduction
described in [15]. In case of 2 × 2 deduction in particular, the methods are
equivalent and produce exactly the same results.
6.3 Subjective Logic Abduction
Subjective logic abduction requires the inversion of conditional opinions of
the formωX|yj into conditional opinions of the formωY |xi similarly to Eq.(7).
The inversion of probabilistic conditionals according to Eq.(7) uses the divi-
sion operator for probabilities. While a division operator for binomial opin-
ions is defined in [14], a division operator for multinomial opinions would
be intractable because it involves matrix and vector expressions. Instead we
define inverted conditional opinions as an uncertainty maximised opinion.
It is natural to define base rate opinions as vacuous opinions, so that the
base rate vector ~a alone defines their probability expectation values. The ra-
tionale for defining inversion of conditional opinions as producing maximum
uncertainty is that it involves multiplication with a vacuous base rate opinion
which produces an uncertainty maximised product. Let |X | = k and |Y | = l,
and assume the set of available conditionals to be:
ωX|Y :
{
ωX|yj , where j = 1 . . . l
}
. (50)
Assume further that the analyst requires the set of conditionals expressed as:
ωY |X :
{
ωY |xi , where i = 1 . . . k
}
. (51)
First compute the l different probability expectation values of each in-
verted conditional opinion ωY |xi , according to Eq.(7) as:
E(yj|xi) =
a(yj)E(ωX|yj(xi))∑l
t=1 a(yt)E(ωX|yt(xi))
(52)
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where a(yj) denotes the base rate of yj . Consistency requires that:
E(ωY |xi(yj)) = E(yj |xi) . (53)
The simplest opinions that satisfy Eq.(53) are the k dogmatic opinions:
ωY |xi :

bY |xi(yj) = E(yj|xi), for j = 1 . . . k ,
uY |xi = 0 ,
~aY |xi = ~aY .
(54)
Uncertainty maximisation of ωY |xi consists of converting as much belief
mass as possible into uncertainty mass while preserving consistent proba-
bility expectation values according to Eq.(53). The result is the uncertainty
maximised opinion denoted as ω̂Y |xi . This process is illustrated in Fig.6.
FIGURE 6
Uncertainty maximisation of dogmatic opinion
It must be noted that Fig.6 only represents two dimensions of the multino-
mial opinions on Y , namely yj and its complement. The line defined by
E(yj |xi) = bY |xi(yj) + aY |xi(yj)uY |xi (55)
that is parallel to the base rate line and that joins ωY |xi and ω̂Y |xi in Fig.6,
defines the opinions ωY |xi for which the probability expectation values are
consistent with Eq.(53). An opinion ω̂Y |xi is uncertainty maximised when
Eq.(55) is satisfied and at least one belief mass of ω̂Y |xi is zero. In general,
not all belief masses can be zero simultaneously except for vacuous opinions.
In order to find the dimension(s) that can have zero belief mass, the belief
mass will be set to zero in Eq.(55) successively for each dimension yj ∈ Y ,
resulting in l different uncertainty values defined as:
uj
Y |xi
=
E(yj|xi)
aY |xi(yj)
, where j = 1 . . . l . (56)
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The minimum uncertainty expressed as Min[uj
Y |xi
, for j = 1 . . . l] deter-
mines the dimension which will have zero belief mass. Setting the belief
mass to zero for any other dimension would result in negative belief mass for
other dimensions. Assume that yt is the dimension for which the uncertainty
is minimum. The uncertainty maximised opinion can then be determined as:
ω̂Y |xi :

bY |xi(yj) = E(yj|xi)− aY (yj)u
t
Y |xi
, for y = 1 . . . l
uY |xi = u
t
Y |xi
~aY |xi = ~aY
(57)
By defining ωY |xi = ω̂Y |xi , the expressions for the set of inverted con-
ditional opinions ωY |xi (with i = 1 . . . k) emerges. Conditional abduction
according to Eq.(33) with the original set of conditionals ωX|Y is now equiv-
alent to conditional deduction according to Eq.(32) where the set of inverted
conditionals ωY |X is used deductively. The difference between deductive and
abductive reasoning with opinions is illustrated in Fig.7 below.
(a) Deduction. (b) Abduction.
FIGURE 7
Visualising deduction and abduction with opinions
Fig.7 shows that deduction uses conditionals defined over the child frame,
and that abduction uses conditionals defined over the parent frame.
6.4 Example 4: Military Intelligence Analysis with Subjective Logic
Example 2 is revisited, but now with conditionals and evidence represented
as subjective opinions according to Table 4 and Eq.(58).
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Troop movements
Opinions x1 : x2 : x3 : X
ωX|Y No movemt. Minor movemt. Full mob. Any
ωX|y1 : b(x1) = 0.50 b(x2) = 0.25 b(x3) = 0.25 u = 0.00
ωX|y2 : b(x1) = 0.00 b(x2) = 0.50 b(x3) = 0.50 u = 0.00
ωX|y3 : b(x1) = 0.00 b(x2) = 0.25 b(x3) = 0.75 u = 0.00
TABLE 4
Conditional opinion ωX|Y : troop movement xi given military plan yj
The opinion about troop movements is expressed as the opinion:
ωX =

b(x1) = 0.00, a(x1) = 0.70
b(x2) = 0.50, a(x2) = 0.20
b(x3) = 0.50, a(x3) = 0.10
u = 0.00
(58)
First the conditional opinions must be inverted as expressed in Table 5.
Opinions of military plans given troop movement
ωY |x1 ωY |x2 ωY |x3
Military plan No movemt. Minor movemt. Full mob.
y1: No aggression b(y1) = 1.00 b(y1) = 0.00 b(y1) = 0.00
y2: Minor ops. b(y2) = 0.00 b(y2) = 0.17 b(y2) = 0.14
y3: Invasion b(y3) = 0.00 b(y3) = 0.00 b(y3) = 0.14
Y : Any u = 0.00 u = 0.83 u = 0.72
TABLE 5
Conditional opinions ωY |X : military plan yj given troop movement xi
Then the likelihoods of countryA’s plans can be computed as the opinion:
ωY ‖X =

b(y1) = 0.00, a(y1) = 0.70, E(y1) = 0.54
b(y2) = 0.16, a(y2) = 0.20, E(y2) = 0.31
b(y3) = 0.07, a(y3) = 0.10, E(y3) = 0.15
u = 0.77
(59)
These results can be compared with those of Eq.(13) which were derived
with probabilities only, and which are equal to the probability expectation
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values given in the rightmost column of Eq.(59). The important observation
to make is that although y1 (no aggression) seems to be country A’s most
likely plan in probabilistic terms, this likelihood is based on uncertainty only.
The only firm evidence actually supports y2 (minor aggression) or y3 (full
invasion), where y2 has the strongest support (b(y2) = 0.16). A likelihood
expressed as a scalar probability can thus hide important aspects of the anal-
ysis, which will only come to light when uncertainty is explicitly expressed,
as done in the example above.
7 BAYESIAN NETWORKS WITH SUBJECTIVE LOGIC
A Bayesian network is a graphical model for conditional relationships. Specif-
ically, a Bayesian network is normally defined as a directed acyclic graph of
nodes representing variables and arcs representing conditional dependence
relations among the variables.
Equipped with the operators for conditional deduction and abduction, it is
possible to analyse Bayesian networks with subjective logic. For example,
the simple Bayesian network:
X −→ Y −→ Z (60)
can be modelled by defining conditional opinions between the three frames.
In case conditionals can be obtained with X as antecedent and Y as conse-
quent, then deductive reasoning can be applied to the edge [X : Y ]. In case
there are available conditionals with Y as antecedent and X as consequent,
then abductive reasoning must be applied.
In the example illustrated in Fig.8 it is assumed that deductive reasoning
can be applied to both [X : Y ] and [Y : Z].
The frames X and Y thus represent parent and child of the first condi-
tional edge, and the frames Y and Z represent parent and child of the second
conditional edge respectively.
This chaining of conditional reasoning is possible because of the symmetry
between the parent and child frames. They both consist of sets of mutually
exclusive elements, and subjective opinions can be applied to both. In general
it is arbitrary which frame is the antecedent and which frame is the consequent
in a given conditional edge. Conditional reasoning is possible in either case,
by applying the deductive or the abductive operator.
Frame pairs to consider as parent-child relationships must have a degree
of relevance to each other. The relevance between two nodes can be formally
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FIGURE 8
Deductive opinion structure for the Bayesian network of Eq.(60)
expressed as a relevance measure, and is a direct function of the condition-
als. For probabilistic conditional deduction, the relevance denoted as R(y, x)
between two states y and x can be defined as:
R(y, x) = |p(y|x)− p(y|x)| . (61)
It can be seen that R(y, x) ∈ [0, 1], where R(y, x) = 0 expresses total
irrelevance, and R(y, x) = 1 expresses total relevance between y and x.
For conditionals expressed as opinions, the same type of relevance be-
tween a given state yj ∈ Y and a given state xi ∈ X can be defined as:
R(yj , xi) = |E(ωY |xi(yj))− E(ωY |xj (yj))| . (62)
The relevance between a child frame Y and a given state xi ∈ X of a
parent frame can be defined as:
R(Y, xi) = Max[R(yj , xi), j = 1, . . . l] . (63)
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Finally, the relevance between a child frame Y and a parent frame X can
be defined as:
R(Y,X) = Max[R(Y, xi), i = 1, . . . k] . (64)
In our model, the relevance measure of Eq.(64) is the most general.
In many situations there can be multiple parents for the same child, which
requires fusion of the separate child opinions into a single opinion. The ques-
tion then arises which type of fusion is most appropriate. The two most typi-
cal situations to consider are the cumulative case and the averaging case.
Cumulative fusion is applicable when independent evidence is accumu-
lated over time such as by continuing observation of outcomes of a process.
Averaging fusion is applicable when two sources provide different but inde-
pendent opinions so that each opinion is weighed as a function of its certainty.
Both cumulative and averaging situations are encountered in practical sit-
uations, and their operators are provided below. The cumulative operator of
fusing opinions [10] represents a generalisation of the consensus operator[9].
Definition 7 (Cumulative Fusion Operator)
Let ωA and ωB be opinions respectively held by agents A and B over the
same frame X = {xj |j = 1, · · · l}. Let ωA⋄B be the opinion such that:
Case I: For uA 6= 0 ∨ uB 6= 0 :
bA⋄B(xj) =
bA(xj)u
B+bB(xj)u
A
uA+uB−uAuB
uA⋄B = u
AuB
uA+uB−uAuB
(65)
Case II: For uA = 0 ∧ uB = 0 :
bA⋄B(xj) = γ
A bA(xj) + γ
BbB(xj)
uA⋄B = 0
(66)
where γA = lim
uA→0
uB→0
uB
uA + uB
and γB = lim
uA→0
uB→0
uA
uA + uB
Then ωA⋄B is called the cumulatively fused bba of ωA and ωB , represent-
ing the combination of independent opinions of A andB. By using the symbol
‘⊕’ to designate this belief operator, we define ωA⋄B ≡ ωA ⊕ ωB .
The averaging operator for opinions [10] represents a generalisation of the
consensus operator for dependent opinions [13, 16].
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Theorem 1 (Averaging Fusion Rule)
Let ωA and ωB be opinions respectively held by agents A and B over the
same frame X = {xj | j = 1, · · · , l}. Let ωA⋄B be the opinion such that:
Case I: For uA 6= 0 ∨ uB 6= 0 :
bA⋄B(xj) =
bA(xj)u
B+bB(xj)u
A
uA+uB
uA⋄B = 2u
AuB
uA+uB
(67)
Case II: For uA = 0 ∧ uB = 0 :
bA⋄B(xj) = γ
A bA(xj) + γ
BbB(xj)
uA⋄B = 0
(68)
where γA = lim
uA→0
uB→0
uB
uA + uB
and γB = lim
uA→0
uB→0
uA
uA + uB
Then ωA⋄B is called the averaged opinion of ωA and ωB, representing the
combination of the dependent opinions of A and B. By using the symbol ‘⊕’
to designate this belief operator, we define ωA⋄B ≡ ωA⊕ωB .
In case of dogmatic opinions, the cumulative and the averaging operators
are equivalent. This is so because dogmatic opinions must be interpreted as
opinions based on infinite evidence, so that two different opinions necessarily
must be dependent, in which case the averaging operator is applicable.
By fusing child opinions resulting from multiple parents, arbitrarily large
Bayesian networks can be constructed. Depending on the situation it must be
decided whether the cumulative or the averaging operator is applicable. An
example with three grandparent framesX1, X2, X3, two parent parent frames
Y1, Y2 and one child frame Z is illustrated in Fig.9 below.
The nodes X1, X2, X3 and Y2 represent initial parent frames because they
do not themselves have parents in the model. Opinions about the initial parent
nodes represent the input evidence to the model.
When representing Bayesian networks as graphs, the structure of condi-
tionals is hidden in the edges, and only the nodes consisting of parent and
children frames are shown.
When multiple parents can be identified for the same child, there are two
important considerations. Firstly, the relative relevance between the child and
each parent, and secondly the relevance or dependence between the parents.
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FIGURE 9
Bayesian network with multiple parent evidence nodes
Strong relevance between child and parents is desirable, and models should
include the strongest child-parent relationships that can be identified, and for
which there is evidence directly or potentially available.
Dependence between parents should be avoided as far as possible. A more
subtle and hard to detect dependence can originate from hidden parent nodes
outside the Bayesian network model itself. In this case the parent nodes have a
hidden common grand parent node which makes them dependent. Philosoph-
ically speaking everything depends on everything in some way, so absolute
independence is never achievable. There will often be some degree of depen-
dence between evidence sources, but which from a practical perspective can
be ignored. When building Bayesian network models it is important to be
aware of possible dependencies, and try to select parent evidence nodes that
have the lowest possible degree of dependence.
As an alternative method for managing dependence it could be possible
to allow different children to share the same parent by fissioning the parent
opinion, or alternatively taking dependence into account during the fusion
operation. The latter option can be implemented by applying the averaging
fusion operator.
It is also possible that evidence opinions provided by experts need to be
discounted due to the analysts doubt in their reliability. This can be done with
the trust transitivity operator¶ of subjective logic.
¶ Also called discounting operator
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Definition 8 (Trust Transitivity) Let A, B and be two agents where A’s
opinion aboutB’s recommendations is expressed as a binomial opinionωAB =
{bAB, d
A
B, u
A
B, a
A
B}, and letX be a frame whereB’s opinion aboutX is recom-
mended toAwith the opinionωBX = {~bBX , uBX ,~aBX}. Let ωA:BX = {~bA:BX , uA:BX ,~aA:BX }
be the opinion such that:
bA:BX (xi) = b
A
Bb
B
X(xi), for i = 1 . . . k ,
uA:BX = d
A
B + u
A
B + b
A
Bu
B
X ,
aA:BX (xi) = a
B
X(xi) .
then ωA:BX is called A’s discounted opinion about X . By using the symbol ⊗
to denote this operator, trust transitivity can be expressed as ωA:BX = ωAB ⊗
ωBX . 2
The transitivity operator is associative but not commutative. Discounting
of opinions through transitivity generally increases the uncertainty mass, and
reduces belief masses.
8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
When faced with complex situations combined with partial ignorance, pure
human cognition and reasoning will often lead to inconsistent and unreliable
conclusions. Practical situations where this can happen include medical di-
agnostic reasoning, the analysis of financial markets, criminal investigations,
and military intelligence analysis, just to name a few examples. In such cases,
reasoning based on subjective logic can complement human reasoning to de-
rive more consistent and reliable conclusions. The challenge for applying
subjective logic to the analysis of such situations, is to
• adequately model the situation, and
• determining the evidence needed as input to the model.
The modelling of a given situation includes defining the relevant parent and
child frames, and defining the conditional opinions that relate parent and child
frames to each other. Determining the evidence consists of determining the
opinions on parent frames from adequate and reliable sources of information.
The results of the analysis are in the form of opinions on child frames of
interest. These derived opinions can then for example assist a medical practi-
tioner to make a more accurate diagnosis, can assist a financial market analyst
to more realistically predict trends and consequences of actions, can assist
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police in uncovering crime scenarios, and can assist intelligence analysts in
predicting military scenarios.
Multinomial subjective opinions consist of a Dirichlet bba and a base rate
function. We have described methods for conditional deduction and condi-
tional abduction with subjective opinions. These methods are based on the
geometric interpretation of opinions as points in pyramids where the dimen-
sionality of a pyramid is equal to the cardinality of the frame. This interpre-
tation provides an intuitive basis for defining conditional reasoning operators
for multinomial opinions. The ability to perform conditional reasoning with
multinomial opinions gives many advantages, such as
• the parent and child frames can be of arbitrary size,
• the reasoning can go in any direction, meaning that for two frames
where there are conditionally dependent subjective opinions, the choice
of parent and child is arbitrary,
• conditional reasoning can be chained as in Bayesian networks,
• conditional reasoning can be done with arbitrary degrees of ignorance
in the opinions,
• the computations are always compatible with classical probabilistic
computations, and in fact
• the computations are reduced to classical probabilistic computations in
case of only using dogmatic opinions.
The cumulative and averaging fusion operators for multinomial opinions
makes it possible to have multiple parents for each child in Bayesian net-
works. In summary, the described methods provide a powerful tool set for
analysing complex situations involving multiple sources of evidence and pos-
sibly long chains of reasoning. This allows uncertainty and incomplete knowl-
edge to be explicitly expressed in the input opinions, and to be carried through
the analysis to the conclusion opinions. In this way the analyst can better ap-
preciate the level of uncertainty associated with the derived conclusions.
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